A partial differential equation is derived, describing the replicator dynamics with mutations of games with a continuous strategy space. This equation is then applied to continuous versions of symmetric 2x2 games, such as the Prisoners Dilemma, Hawk-Dove and Coordination games and to the Ultimatum Game. In the latter case, we find solutions which differ significantly from the expected solution.
Introduction
Evolutionary game dynamics is a fast developing field, with applications in biology, economics, sociology and anthropology. Background material and countless references can be found in the monographs by Weibull [1] , Fudenburg & Levine [2] , Samuelson [3] , Hofbauer & Sigmund [4] , Cressman [5] and Vincent & Brown [6] or in the survey paper by Hofbauer & Sigmund [7] . The standard ingredients of evolutionary game dynamics are a population of players, an n-person game, a set of strategies and a rule to update the distribution of strategies from one generation to the next. Within this general setting several variations are possible: time can be discrete or continuous, populations can be finite or infinite, the game can have a finite or infinite number of strategies. Also, there are several choices for the updating rule, the most popular of which are Adaptive Dynamics (See e.g. Diekmann [8] ) and Replicator Dynamics, introduced by Taylor & Jonker [9] . In this paper we consider a model with continuous time, an infinite population and a 2-person game, where each participant has a continuum of strategies to choose from. The update rule we use is the replicator dynamics, with deterministic mutations. Although this model has been alluded to by Dieckmann [10] , where a hierarchy of evolutionary models is presented, its details have not been worked out before.
From the discrete to the continuous equation
The equation for the replicator dynamics with continuous strategy space will be derived by a limiting process, starting from the equations for the discrete case.
Following Hofbauer and Sigmund [4] , we consider an infinite population of players and a set of strategies S 1 , · · · , S N . When a player A opts for strategy S i against B, who uses S j , the payoff to A is taken to be M ij , and the payoff to B is M ji . Consequently, if p j (t) is the fraction of the whole population that at time t plays the strategy S j , the average payoff to each player using S i is equal to
The average payoff for the whole population therefore is
Now in the course of time, the fraction p i changes at a rate which is proportional to the difference between the payoff to p i and the average payoff for the whole population. In addition we assume that for each player of S j there is a transition probability per unit time to make a spontaneous transfer to strategy S i at a rate given by W ij . In this way the discrete replicator equation with mutation is derived:ṗ
It is easy to show that S(t) ≡ In transforming to a continous strategy space, we replace the discrete index i by a continuous variable s ∈ D ⊂ R n and the variables p i (t) by a probability distribution P (s, t). The payoff matrix M ij must now be replaced by a payoff function M (s, s ), which gives the payoff to strategy s when playing strategy s .
Eq.(3) now takes the form ∂P (s, t) ∂t = (Π(s, P ) − Π(P ))P (s, t) + M(P, s) (4) in which the mutation term is equal to M(P, s) = [W (s|s )P (s , t) − W (s |s)P (s, t)] ds .
The average payoff for strategy s and the total average payoff are given by Π(s, P ) = M (s, s )P (s , t) ds (6) and Π(P ) = Π(s, P )P (s, t) ds.
Let us now restrict ourselves to mutations in which only small changes in the strategies occur and apply the method which is used to derive the Fokker-Planck equation from a master equation [11] . For simplicity of presentation, we restrict ourselves to the case of a one-dimensional strategy space. Define ξ by s = s − ξ and write the mutation rate as a function of s and ξ
and so
Assume now that W (s, ξ) varies slowly in the first variable s and that due to the mutations only small variations in the strategies will occur. Then W (s, ξ) is only nonvanishing when ξ is small. In the mutation term (5), which can be written as
we can now expand the dependence on the first variable in powers of ξ and obtain
Because [ W (s, −ξ) − W (s, ξ)]P (s, t)dξ = 0, the first and last term cancel, so that to second order we are left with
in which
We will further simplify the equations by assuming that the average change in strategy due to mutations is equal to zero, so α 1 (s) = 0, and that the average of the square of this change is constant, so α 2 (s) = 2σ. The final form of the continuous replicator equation (4) then becomes
where we have restored the correct dimensionality of the strategy space by replacing
∂s 2 by the n-dimensional Laplace operator. P (s, t) should satisfy P (s, t) ≥ 0 and S(t) ≡ D P (s, t) ds, should be equal to unity at all times. This last condition is fulfilled when we choose Neumann, or reflecting, boundary conditions:
where n is the normal to the boundary ∂D of the domain D. Indeed, integrating (14) over D and using (15) we find
showing that if S(0) = 1 then S(t) = 1 for all times. In the case that σ = 0, condition (15) is not required to ensure that S(t) remain constant in time.
The rate at which the total average fitness Π(P ) changes is given by:
Therefore, when the diffussion term is absent, σ = 0, the average fitness cannot decrease. Equation (14) is a nonlinear reaction-diffusion equation, where the reaction term Π(s, P (t)) − Π(P (t)) is nonlocal. On the function space of twice continuous space-differentiable and once time-differentiable functions, we can show that the solution of (14) exists for all times. This follows from the assumption that M (s, s ) is bounded on D, so that Π(s,
Standard comparison theorems for parabolic equations (Pao [12] ) complete the proof. Also, by standard positivity results for parabolic equations, it can be shown that the when the initial distribution P (s, 0) ≥ 0, then P (s, t) ≥ 0 for all times t.
Numerical simulations suggest that even stronger results hold. In particular, we suspect that the solution of Eqs. (14) , (15) is uniformly (in space and time) bounded in terms of the sup-norm of the initial distribution, and that it converges to a stationary solution.
For σ = 0, Eq. (14) has been studied by Cressman [13] and Oechsler & Riedel [14] . They show that Eq.(14) has a unique solution, for all times, on a large space of distributions, containing amongst others the Dirac-delta distributions.
Symmetric 2x2 games
In symmetric 2 × 2 games there are two possible strategies, denoted by I and II. The payoff to player A is given by the payoff matrix
Discrete replicator dynamics
The discrete replicator dynamics associated with this game consists of an infinite population where a fraction x 1 (t) plays the pure strategy I and a a fraction x 2 (t) plays the pure strategy II . The payoffs to strategies I and II are given by:
The average payoff to the total population is then
With a mutation rate matrix of the form W = σ 0 1 1 0 , σ > 0 and using
, this leads to the following equation for x 1 (t) : The Hawk-Dove game (also known as Chicken) has a = (G − C)/2, b = G, c = 0, d = G/2, where now strategy I corresponds to 'hawk' (or 'never back down') and II to 'dove' ('allways back down'). When the cost C to the loser of a hawk-hawk fight is larger than the gain G a hawk makes when confronting a dove, we have A < 0, B > 0. It follows from Eq.(20) that for σ = 0 the solution tends to the stable equilibrium x 1 = B/(B −A) = G/C, describing a population where the strategies co-exist. Also in this case, the effect of the mutation term is restricted to a small shift in the location of the stable equilibrium.
The quadrant with A > 0, B < 0 is the domain of the Coordination Games, exemplified by the situation a = 2, b = 0, c = 0, d = 1. In a Coordination Game it is advantageous for both players to play the same strategy. In a 2 × 2 game, this leads to two equilibria. Note, however, that in the example mentioned here the situation where both play strategy I is superior to the one where both play II. For σ = 0 there are two stable solutions and one unstable one, and the final outcome depends on the initial situation. When x 1 (0) < 1 3 the solution will ultimately tend to x 1 = 0, otherwise to x 1 = 1. In other words, when the initial fraction of strategy I players is too small, the final population will consist exclusively of strategy II players, even though this is the less attractive of the two equilibria.
In the case of Coordination Games, the effect of mutation can qualitatively change this picture. From this picture it follows that for values of σ larger than a critical value σ c (in this example σ c ≈ 0.11) the only equilibrium left is the optimal one near x 1 = 1, which is also the globally attracting solution.
Discrete replicator dynamics with a stochastic term
In [15] , Eq. (20) is studied, where instead of a deterministic mutation term, a small noise term is added. This leads to the stochastic equation:
where G(x) = x(1 − x)(B + (A − B)x) and W (t) denotes a Wiener process with zero mean and unit variance.
In this model, the mutation from one strategy to another does not happen at a fixed rate, as in the model described by Eq. (20) , but rather the fraction x 1 (t) is changed by a small random amount per time-step. To describe the outcome of Eq. (21), we consider the evolution of the probability density f (x, t). The probability that at time t the fraction of strategy I players lies in the interval [x, x + ∆x] is given by f (x, t)∆x. The equation for f (x, t) is the Fokker-Planck equation [11] :
We assume reflecting boundaries, which yield as boundary conditions:
Eq. (22) with conditions (23) has a unique, attracting, stationary distribution f * (x) [15] . It is easy to see that this equilibrium distribution is given by
where the constant C is determined by the condition
from which it follows that the extrema of f * (x) are the zeroes of G(x), which are the equilibria of the discrete replicator equation (20) with σ = 0. Differentiating once more gives
so at an equilibrium point x e we have that
with K > 0. Therefore, a stable equilibrium of Eq. (20) with σ = 0 corresponds to a maximum of f * (x), and an unstable equilibrium to a minimum. In the limit σ → 0, the stationary distribution f * (x) will tend to a pointdistribution, where the total probability is concentrated on one point. In the case of the Hawk-Dove Game and the Prisoners Dilemma it is clear that this point-distribution is concentrated on the unique stable equilibrium of the corresponding discrete replicator equation. For Coordination Games, there are two stable equilibria in the discrete case. Correspondingly, the stationary distribution has two local maximuma, namely at x = 0 and at x = 1. In [15] it is proved that for σ → 0 one of these two maxima will eventually dominate. The equilibrium that finally emerges is the one which has the largest basin of attraction in the discrete case, and is known in the game-theory literature as the risk-dominant equilibrium.
Continuous replicator dynamics
The two strategy set of 2 × 2 games can be extended to a continuum of strategies, each of which indicated by a real number x [0, 1]. For the payoff function M (x, x ) we choose a simple interpolation between the four payoff values of the symmetric 2 × 2 game:
This game can be considered as the underlying discrete 2×2 game where now mixed strategies are allowed, in the following sense. A strategy x [0, 1] means that the player will use pure strategy I with probability x. We now assume that two players, using strategies x and x respectively, at one encounter play each other a large number of times. Eq.(27) then gives the expectation value of the payoff to the first player. Because our players will soon become aware of the Law of Large Numbers, they won't bother with playing against each other, but at an encounter simply settle for the payoff given by Eq.(27), making this a deterministic game.
The expressions for Π(x, P ) and Π(P ) are easy to calculate:
is the average strategy. Then
and
where A and B are the same parameters as defined in section 3.1. Eq. (14) for P (x, t) now becomes:
with boundary conditions:
and an intial distribution P (x, 0).
The equation without mutation
As was noted before, when considering Eq.(30) without mutation, i.e. with σ = 0, it is not necessary to impose the boundary conditions (31) in order to ensure that 1 0
P (x, t) dx remain constant. In [13] it is shown that
has a unique solution for all t > 0. In this subsection we will analyse the asymptotic behaviour of the solution of Eq.(32) as t → ∞. Firstly, the equation for the average x(t) is given by:
where x 2 (t) = 1 0 (A, B) ∈ I: in this case (B + (A − B)x(t)) > 0 for all t, so x(t) is an increasing function. Because P (x, t) = 0 for x / ∈ [0, 1], the distribution will accumulate at x = 1 and lim t→∞ x(t) = 1. In the cases I, III and IV the limiting distributions P ∞ (x) = lim t→∞ P (x, t) are point-distributions concentrated on one of the endpoints of the domain [0, 1] . This is comparable with the results in the model described in section 3.2 when σ → 0: eventually all players will play either one or the other of the pure strategies. The situation is quite different for case II, i.e. for Hawk-Dove type games. We will show that in this case, P ∞ (x) depends on the initial condition P 0 (x), but is in general non-zero on all of [0, 1] . This is a dramatic difference with the above mentioned model. There, the population is divided into a fraction B/(B − A) of the population who play pure strategy I and the rest who play strategy II. In our model, where the players have access to a continuum of mixed strategies, we do not find that everybody plays the mixed strategy x = B/(B − A) (play strategy I with probability B/(B − A)), as might be expected. Rather, the final outcome is a population who's members play a broad range of strategies, although the average value of the strategies played is x = B/(B − A). The details are as follows.
is a solution of Eq.(32). We will now show that this set of distributions is attractive. Let λ(t) = (B + (A − B)x(t)). The solution of Eq.(32) then is
Therefore
Differentiating relation (35) with respect to t yields
Using g (t) = λ(t), and Eq.(35), this reduces to
Since lim t→∞ x(t) = B/(B − A), then g(t) = t 0 (B + (A − B)x(t )) dt either tends to a finite limit or diverges. Using the change of variable u = x g(t), we can write:
Therefore, when g(t) → ∞, then
By a similar argument, when g(t) → −∞ then x(t) → 0. Since lim t→∞ x(t) = B/(B−A) is neither 0 nor 1, it follows that lim t→∞ g(t) = g 0 is finite. Therefore, as t → ∞ the solution Eq.(36) tends to
which is clearly not a point-distribution. The value of g 0 can be found from Eq.(37), which in the limit t → ∞ reads:
This equation for g 0 can be solved numerically for given values of A and B and a given initial distribution P 0 (x). In figure 3 , two examples, both with A = −3 and B = 7, are given for different initial distributions, shown in the left column.
In the right column the final distributions are plotted. Numerical experiments show that all solutions of the full equation (30) converge to a time-independent solution. The equation for these stationary solutions is given by:
Rather than giving a definition of x in terms of P (x), we take x to be a free parameter and impose the conditions (39). Integrating Eq. (38) over x from 0 to 1 then yields:
Assuming that B + (A − B)x = 0, the equality 
where the Airy functions Ai(z) and Bi(z) are the standard linearly independent solutions of y (z) − zy(z) = 0. These functions are plotted in figure 4 . The position −η 0 of the first maximum of Ai(z) is indicated by a vertical line segment. The curve for Bi(z) is dashed. Imposing the boundary conditions
so that a non-trivial solution only exists if x is a solution to the "eigenvalue equation":
Corresponding to a solution x of Eq. (43), we find that the solution (42) can be written as:
in which c is determined by the normalisation condition. We found that, although the eigenvalue equation (43) can have many solutions, there will be at most three that correspond to a distribution (44) with the property that P . More precisely, we have:
This solution is consistent with the assumption s(x) = 1 if and only if A > 0, as in the Prisoners Dilemma and the Cooperation Game. The corresponding asymptotic expression for P (x) becomes:
Note that for σ → 0 this distribution becomes sharply peaked at x = 1, with the width of the peak proportional to σ 1/3 . By a similar reasoning, it is found that for B < 0 (as in the Cooperation Game) there exists a solution such that
In the previous section we found that for σ = 0 the Hawk-Dove Game and the Cooperation Game have solutions with x = remains bounded as as σ → 0. We therefore assume that
where α ∈ R is as yet unknown. Substituting Eq.(45) into Eq.(43) and taking the limit σ → 0 yields:
where α 1/3 is understood to mean sign(α)|α| 1/3 . This is the equation from which α must be solved. Although Eq.(46) has many zeroes, only one corresponds to a positive distribution given by: Away from the limit σ → 0, we can track the fate of the central solution as σ grows. Since the full eigenvalue-equation (43) is not invariant under A → −A, B → −B, the situation is different for Hawk-Dove Games as opposed to Coordination Games. For Hawk-Dove Games, we find that the central solution persists for all values of the diffusion coefficient σ. However, for Coordination Games we find that above a critical value σ c of σ, the unstable central solution disappears, together with one of the two stable solutions, leaving only one attracting, stationary solution. When A < |B|, the solution at x = 1 remains, and when A > |B|, the solution near x = 0 survives. This can be summarised by saying that for large enough values of σ, the only attracting solution is a stationary solution near the risk-dominated solution of the discrete equation. The bifurcation process is illustrated in figure 8 ,where for two values of σ the left-hand-side of Eq.(43) is plotted as a function of x(σ). For σ = 0.0035 this function has three zeroes, whereas for σ = 0.0039 there is only one. This closely resembles the situation in the discrete case as described in section 2. However, the critical values for σ in the discrete case and in the continuous case are not comparable (0.11 vs. 0.0037).
Summary
Here we summarise and compare the results of the three types of games, using the discrete model, the discrete model with a stochastic term and the continuous model with deterministic mutation.
The Prisoners Dilemma is straightforward. In the discrete case the population will eventually play All Defect. This does not change when the strategyspace is made continuous and adding deterministic mutation simply changes the limiting delta-distribution to a finite peak with width proportional to σ 1/3 . The contrast with the corresponding stochastic equation is that there the width of the peak is narrower and proportional to σ 1/2 . In the discrete version of the Coordination Game, the population will eventually play either x 1 = 0 or x 1 = 1, where the final outcome depends on the intial condition. If the mutation rate is larger than a certain threshhold, only the stable solution around the risk-dominant solution remains. This result remains the same in the continuous case. Depending on the initial distribution of strategies, the final distribution will be sharply peaked (width of peak proportional to σ 1/3 ) around either x = 0 or x = 1. When the mutation rate becomes larger than a critical value, only the distribution around the risk-dominant solution remains. We note that this critical value is much smaller in the continuous case than in the discrete case. The stochastic equation has only one, attracting, stationary solution. When the mutation rate σ is small, this distribution is almost completely concentrated around the risk dominant solution, where again the width of the distribution is proportional to σ 1/2 . The Hawk-Dove Game shows the following behaviour. In the discrete case, there is an asymptotically stable solution for all values of σ > 0, which for σ = 0 has the value x 1 = B/(B − A). The stochastic equation has a unique attracting stationary solution, peaked around x = B/(B − A) and with a width proportional to σ 1/2 . Without mutation, σ = 0, the continuous equation has an asymptotically stable invariant set of solutions, consisting of all distributions P (x) with average x = B/(B − A). Depending on the initial distribution, the solution converges to a member of this set. When the mutation term is added, σ > 0, only one, attracting, solution remains. In the limit σ → 0, this solution converges to (47). This solution is not concentrated on a single point, but has the whole interval [0, 1] as support. Such a solution is sometimes referred to as polymorphic. For small σ, numerical experiments show that a starting distribution initially converges to a distribution close to the solution it would reach if σ = 0, but then slowly (on a time-scale of 1/σ) evolves to the unique limiting solution. This behaviour resembles that of a singulary perturbed ordinary differential equation, which in the unperturbed case has an attracting set of fixed points, and where after adding the perturbation, the attracting invariant set survives. In this invariant set we would have, in this analogy, one attracting fixed point left.
The Ultimatum Game
This game has attracted a great deal of interest, mainly as a model to explain the occurrence of strong reciprocity in populations of supposedly selfish individuals.(Binmore [16] , Fehr & Gachter [17] ). Here "strong reciprocity" means the willingness to share, but also to punish egotistical behaviour in others, even at a cost to oneself. See Bowles & Gintis [18] .
The game is played by two players. The first player is given a certain amount of money and proposes a split of this money with the second player. This second player has the choice between accepting the offer, or rejecting it, in which case neither of the two players will receive anything. An obvious strategy for the second player is to accept every offer, since something is better than nothing. Realising this, the first player will maximise his share by offering the lowest possible amount to the second player. This (combined) strategy is sometimes referred to as "the rational solution" (Page & Nowak [19] ), "the subgame-perfect equilibrium" (Seymour [20] ) or the strategy of "Homo Economicus" (Bowles & Gintis [21] ).
An evolutionary version of this game, taking into account mutations, was studied in [19] and by Nowak et al. [22] , using adaptive dynamics. In adaptive dynamics models, the population is assumed to always be monomorphic, i.e., everybody plays the same strategy. Every now and then, a mutant is introduced. If the strategy of the mutant is more succesful than the resident strategy, it will quickly spread in the population, thus becoming the new resident strategy. For the Ultimatum Game it was found that in the absence of any restrictions, the solution of the adaptive dynamics model indeed converged to the "rational solution".
The Ultimatum Game was also studied by Seymour [20] , using replicator dynamics. He included mutations as a given, exogeneous term and found that other solutions can emerge, far from the "subgame-perfect solution", depending on the form and intensity of the mutation function.
We model the Ultimatum Game as follows. The strategy space is S = [0, 1] × [0, 1], where a stategy s = (x, y) ∈ S means that the player, in the role of nr. 1, will offer a fraction x, while in the role of nr. 2 he will reject any offer lower than y.
In one round, the players will play the role of nr. 1 and nr. 2 alternately. This leads to a payoff function giving the payoff to strategy s when playing strategy s (the factor 1/2 has been omitted):
in which the Heaviside function is defined by
Before writing down the full replicator equation (14) for this case we first introduce a number of abbreviations:
which are normalised as
Q(x, t) and R(y, t) are defined by
so that Q(0, t) = 0 and Q(1, t) = 1 and R(1, t) = 0.
In terms of these functions the local and global averages take the form
with
At last the replicator equation becomes
in which ∆ is the two-dimensional Laplace operator. The boundary condition is ∇P · n = 0 on the boundary.
In what follows we will restrict ourselves to solutions which can be written as the product of two normalised functions of (x, t) and of (y, t) respectively. It then necessarily follows that
With this restriction we easily show, by integrating Eq.(57) over y, that
The boundary conditions are
Integration over x of Eq.(57) leads to
with boundary conditions
We note that for σ = 0 these equations are the same as those studied in [20] , where it is assumed that there are two separate populations of players, one where all members always play the role of nr. 1 and the other with nr. 2 players.
The equation without mutation
For σ = 0 the equations become:
Similar to the Hawk-Dove Game, we identify a set of stationary solutions:
where v(y) is an arbitrary function with x 0 v(y) dy = 1 and δ(z) is the Dirac-δ distribution. The solution (65) is easily checked, by noting that R(y) = xΘ(x − y) and that Q(x) = 1. We have also used z δ(z) ≡ 0. The interpretation of this solution is clear: player nr. 1 always offers x, so player nr. 2 will always receive this amount, as long as his acceptence threshhold is below x. The average payoff is therefore Π = c 1 + c 2 = 1 and any distribution of the y-values below x is stationary, given this distribution of x. The limit x → 0 corresponds to the subgame-perfect solution.
To show that (65) represents an attracting set of solutions, we use the same reasoning as in section 3.3.1, and find
By differentiating Eq. (66) and (68), respectively, we obtain:
Assuming that V (y, t) converges to a stationary distribution (as all numerical results show), then (1 − x) t 0 Q(x, t ) dt converges to a function with a finite number of isolated local maxima. One of these, say x = x, is the absolute maximum, and it follows from Eq.(67) that H(x, t) converges to δ(x − x). From Eq.(52) it follows that R(y, t) converges to R(y) = x Θ(x − y) and V (y, t) converges to c V 0 (y)Θ(x − y), with c a normalization constant. From Eq.(56) it follows that c 1 (t) converges to 1 − x and c 2 (t) to x. The above considerations show that if the solution of Eq.(64) converges to a stationary solution, it must be a member of the invariant set (65). However, the value of x cannot be predicted from the above formula's. Numerical solution of Eq.(64) shows that for random initial distributions of H(x, 0) and V (y, 0) on the whole interval [0, 1], the functions H(x, t) and V (y, t) indeed approach the form of Eq.(65) for t → ∞. The average strategy x, based on 100 simulations, takes values between 0.12 and 0.30, with a mean value equal to 0.22 and a standard deviation of 0.04. We note that a uniform distribution of both H(x, 0) and V (y, 0) also leads to a value of x = 0.22.
The equation with mutation
We have found numerically that when σ > 0, all solutions of the full equations (60) and (62) tend to a unique solution of the stationary equations:
The boundary values are those of Eqs. (61) and (63). Unfortunately, we have not been able to find closed form expressions for the solutions of these equations. There are two ways to approximate the stationary solution, which lead to the same result. First, we numerically solved the full equations(60) and (62), by discretising space, solving the resulting coupled set of ordinary differential equations and considering the solution as t → ∞. In the second method, we define the following seven functions
In terms of these functions and with k = 1/σ ,the stationary equations can now be written as
These equation can be solved numerically by starting the integration from the following values at x = 1
and using a standard routine to arrive at the values of these functions in x = 0. The numbers (a,b,c 1 ,c 2 ) are as yet unknown. They should be chosen in such a way that the boundary conditions at x = 0 be satisfied, i.e., We note that H(x) has a Gauss-like distribution around a mean value x = 0.3172, while V (y) is approximated by the right half of a Gaussian, with its maximum at y = 0. For smaller values of σ, the value of x(σ) and the width of the peak of the H(x)-distribution decrease, but the shape of the distributions is otherwise unchanged.
For values of σ down to 10 −9 we have calculated the σ-dependence of x. In figure 10 
Conclusions
In this paper we have generalised the replicator dynamics of games with deterministic mutations, as described in [4] , to the situation where players have access to a continuous strategy space. The resulting equation (14) has a well defined solution, which, however, is not easy to analyse in general.
Our first example, the continuous version of 2 × 2 symmetric games, already illustrates a number of interesting and perhaps unexpected features of this equation. Although there is no a priori reason to believe that the continuous and the discrete strategy version of the same 2 × 2 game have anything to do with each other, the similarities between some results warrant our surprise at the differences in others. The continuous Prisoners Dilemma and the Coordination Game behave similar to their discrete case counterparts: the final state is a monomorphic distribution, where every player in the population plays one of the two pure strategies. The extension to a continuous strategy space and the inclusion of mutation (which has the form of a diffusion term) only leads to the existence of small variations around the single peak of the final distribution. Also in the continuous Coordination Game we encounter, as in the discrete case, a threshold value for the mutation term separating a regime with two attracting solutions from one where only a single attractor exists.
The difference occurs in the Hawk-Dove game. In the discrete version there is a stable equilibrium with Hawks and Doves coexisting. In the continuous version this does not translate into a monomorphic distribution around the mixed strategy corresponding to this equilibrium. Rather, in the unique limiting distribution the whole range of mixed strategies from pure Hawk to pure Dove is represented. The attraction to this stationary solution occurs on two time scales. On a fast time scale, the solution is attracted to the set of distributions with average corresponding to the equilibrium mixed strategy of the discrete case. Then, on a slow time scale proportional to the inverse of the mutation rate, the solution converges to the unique attractor. This two timescales phenomenon was observed in numerical simulations, and is currently awaiting a more thorough analysis. Also, there are many interesting games with three or more strategies (for instance Rock, Scissors, Paper) of which the continuous version can hold more surprises.
The results of the second example, the Ultimatum Game, are of great interest to the debate around strong reciprocity and how it could have evolved. Our model shows that replicator dynamics and a small mutation term can lead to a final outcome far from the subgame-perfect solution. Take, for instance, a mutation rate of 10 −3 . So in every time-interval, all players vary their strategies according to the cold rules of self-interest, after which a small fraction of 0.1% of the population, change their strategy just a little bit. Then we find that an initial population consisting almost entirely of cynical misers (accept everything and offer nothing), eventually turns into a world where the average offer is more than 30%! This surprising result can be explained in the following way. Consider a situation where all proposers offer only a small share to their opponent and these opponents all have an acceptance threshhold lower than this offer. Now, due to mutation, some acceptors will demand a share that is slightly larger than what is being offered. Normally, this would be a suicidal strategy. However, also due to mutation, there will be amongst the proposers a small set who are willing to offer slightly more than their colleagues. On the one hand, these fairer-minded proposers earn slightly less from the bulk of the acceptors, but on the other hand they are the only ones to profit from the small group of highminded mutants on the acceptor-side. The net result can be that the second effect dominates and that there will be a tendency towards higher offers.
For sufficiently small mutation rates the dynamics of the Ultimatum Game show the same structure with two timescales as the continuous Hawk-Dove game. An initial distribution is quickly attracted to a distribution where the offers are sharply peaked, and then slowly converges to the unique stationary solution.
In this case too, a more rigorous mathematical analysis is required for a better understanding of the model. In particular it would be nice to be able to calculate the value of the exponent in the formula relating the mutation rate and the average value of the offers, which in this paper we derived from numerical simulations. For this purpose singular perturbation theory seems to be an appropriate tool. Furthermore, we have only considered mutation rates that are the same for the proposers as for the acceptors. Differentiating between these may also lead to a fuller understanding.
